Lower Salaries and No Options – On the Optimal Structure of Executive Pay

This website provides interested readers with additional materials on the paper “Lower Salaries and No Options – On the Optimal Structure of Executive Pay” by Ingolf Dittmann and Ernst Maug (Journal of Finance, 62:1, 303-343, 2007).

Paper
The last working paper version of the paper itself can be downloaded here from SSRN.

Savings
This is an Excel-sheet with the savings variable defined in the paper. These are the savings the firm could realize from switching from the observed contract to the contract with non-negative options (our base case, see Section III.A) implied by program (16). The dataset contains 5,659 observations from 1,525 U.S. firms over the years 1997 to 2004. The dataset contains 5 variables: the company name (coname), the year (year), the absolute savings (savings_abs, in thousand dollars), the savings relative to the CEO's total compensation costs (savings_rel_pay), and the savings relative to firm value (savings_rel_firm). The variables in the dataset are:

Savings_absThe savings from recontracting in thousand dollars 
Savings_rel_pay The savings from recontracting relative to the CEO's total compensation costs 
Savings_rel_firm     The savings from recontracting relative to the value of the firm 
CONAME The name of the company in Compustat ExecuComp 
year The year of the contract 

Estimates of executive's non-firm wealth
In this paper we construct estimates of CEO non-firm wealth. We have extended these estimates to all executives in ExecuComp and all years until 2008 and make them available on our data website. 

Implementation
This technical note explains some of the derivations used in the paper.

Taxes
This technical note explains the calculations for the tax system in Section VI.A of the paper.